Indigenous Law and Its Contribution to Global Pluralism by Anaya, James
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
Indigenous Law and Its Contribution to Global Pluralism 
James Anaya 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Cultural Heritage Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law 
Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and 
the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Citation Information 
James Anaya, Indigenous Law and Its Contribution to Global Pluralism, 6 Indigenous L.J., no. 1, 2007, at 3, 
available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1195/. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation:
James Anaya, Indigenous Law and Its Contribution to






William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Oct 26 11:57:21 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your 
 acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions 
 of the license agreement available at 
 https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
                                     Use QR Code reader to send PDF 
                                     to your smartphone or tablet device 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Indigenous Law and Its Contribution to
Global Pluralism
JAMES ANAYA*
What I'd like to talk about today is Indigenous law in connection with the
international Indigenous rights movement, and that movement's contribution
to a model of global pluralism and changes in the very structure of
international law. Indigenous legal systems represent particular social,
cultural, and political dimensions of human interaction that define
Indigenous peoples. Indigenous decision-making institutions, land tenure
systems, economic structures and cultural patterns are dependent on and, in
turn, perpetuate the legal traditions that originate in and live through
Indigenous societies.
Yet, powerful forces have long ignored the interests of Indigenous
peoples in maintaining their own legal systems, and worse, have threatened
the very survival of Indigenous peoples. The history of misdealing and
atrocities committed against the Indigenous peoples of the American
continents ever since Christopher Columbus found himself on a Caribbean
island, miscalcuclated his location, and called his hosts Indians, is well
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known. Much less widely known among the dominant sectors are the present
day legacies of that history, such as the residential school situation that we
heard about today. For Indigenous peoples of North America, and elsewhere,
historical acts of oppression are not just blemishes of the past; they translate
rather into current inequities. Peoples indigenous to many parts of the world
have been deprived of vast land holdings and access to life-sustaining
resources. And they have suffered historical forces that have actively
suppressed their political and cultural institutions and legal systems.
In North America, the myth of the vanishing savage was created to
embolden white settlement. But this myth has only been partially embraced
in reality. Although vastly reduced in numbers and in many cases
concentrated in pockets of relative geographic isolation in places called
reserves or reservations, Indigenous peoples, as we've seen manifested
today, are still here. And in the face of tremendous adversity, Indigenous
peoples have long sought not just to survive, but to flourish as distinct
communities on their ancestral lands. In doing so, Indigenous peoples have
employed a number of strategies, including those that enlist the law and the
legal process of the world beyond their communities as agents of change.
However, the limitations of domestic state legal orders have been all too
apparent, these domestic state legal orders having emerged from colonial
patterns. And this is especially so in relation to efforts to have the legal
systems of Indigenous peoples recognized by domestic state legal orders.
Within the architecture of domestic state legal orders, doctrines derived from
colonial-era practice continue to rear their heads and impede the reversal of
the status quo that has been left by the colonizing process. Of course there
are advances and there are spaces within the domestic legal order for
recognition of Indigenous law, but these impediments remain.
So faced with the legal and political barriers in their own countries or in
the states within which they live, Indigenous peoples worldwide have
extended their legal advocacy into the international arena over the past three
decades, especially in the second wave of Indigenous advocacy, as Willie
Littlechild put it, the first being when Chief Deskaheh of the Iroquois
Confederacy and others went to the League of Nations in the 1920s. But in
this second wave over the past three decades, Indigenous peoples have been
appealing to the international community and looking to the international
system to advance their claims.
However, international law has its own set of limitations. It's a body of
transnational rules and procedures and links to international institutions, in
which the state is the primary or dominant actor. Historically, international
law can be seen to have been complicit in patterns of colonization,
ultimately upholding the sovereignty asserted by colonizing states over
Indigenous peoples, and upholding the suppression of Indigenous legal
systems. I admire the arguments made by Professor Kent McNeil, but the
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dominant view is in fact that the international law of the colonial era upheld
the suppression of Indigenous peoples, and that the colonial era law
continues to be applied and regarded as affirming the sovereignty of states
over Indigenous peoples.
But things change and are changing. A good deal of scholarly energy
has gone into examining the changing character of international law,
especially in light of such phenomena as the creation of the United Nations
to formalize a constitutional order of multilateralism and global cooperation,
and the introduction of a normative foundation of peace and security for that
order. Related to these phenomena and contributing to among the most
radical changes in international law over the past century is the development
of an international human rights regime. Human rights were brought
definitively within the fold of international law in the aftermath of the
Second World War and the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945.
The growth of the international human rights regime takes international law
beyond its traditional focus on the rights and duties of states, and establishes
an international legal competency over matters once considered within the
exclusive domain of state authority. Furthermore, the international human
rights regime causes the assertion of raw power to contend with notions of
justice and it provides individuals and other nonstate actors with access,
albeit limited, to avenues of international decision-making. Responding to
Indigenous peoples' demands is a human rights imperative that is now
widely recognized within the international system. And what Willie
Littlechild was talking about today is part of that response. With this
recognition has come a sustained level of international institutional activity
focused on Indigenous peoples' concerns, and a corresponding body of
developing norms, such as the norms of the Declarations we heard about,
that build upon long standing human rights precepts.
But here is what I'd like to focus on today: Indigenous peoples have not
only taken advantages of changes in the character of international law and its
embrace of human rights for their own ends, they also have contributed to
further changes to important structural components of the international legal
system with broader implications. I believe these changes, to which
Indigenous peoples are contributing, are beneficial, not just for Indigenous
peoples themselves, but for humanity more generally. Invoking the
globalized promise of fundamental human rights, Indigenous groups are
asserting claims as distinct peoples with their own legal systems and
associated cultural patterns and political institutions. In doing so, Indigenous
peoples have made significant strides towards contributing to a greater
pluralism in the global legal and political landscape-a pluralism in which
Indigenous peoples and their legal systems are starting to find a place. These
changes are in many ways still embryonic, fragile and face substantial
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obstacles as they progress, but they are perceptible. These changes can be
seen along four fronts which I'll now discuss.
First, Indigenous peoples have helped move international law towards
recognition of collective human rights. Historically, international law
developed to concern only the rights and duties of independent states.
Emerich de Vattel, who is widely regarded as one of the progenitors of
international law, described in the 1 8th century the law of nations as the
"science of the rights which exist between nations or states and of the
obligations corresponding to these rights." As Professor McNeil suggested,
the law of nations was the predecessor to what we call today international
law. International law expanded in the 2 0th century beyond this conception
of law just between states to embrace human rights. But even so, the focus
of the human rights regime until quite recently remained almost entirely on
the rights of the individual as against the state, without much attention to the
collective and associational dimensions of human existence beyond the state.
Thus, embedded in international law is an individual-state dichotomy of
rights and duties.
Bypassing this individual-state dichotomy, Indigenous peoples have
claimed and articulated human rights in terms of group or collective rights.
In multiple written and oral statements, many of them uttered by Willie
Littlechild (forgive me if I keep referring to you, but it's true), Indigenous
leaders and Elders have given lucid explanations and illustrations providing
convincing justifications for collective rights, justifications that I must admit
have eluded, it seems, the academic elite. The international system is
increasingly recognizing collective rights of Indigenous peoples and not just
the individual rights of members of Indigenous communities. In doing so,
the international system is accommodating itself to collective rights in a way
that has potentially broad implications beyond simply the context of
Indigenous peoples. One such international treaty mentioned earlier, ILO
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, affirms an array of rights
belonging to Indigenous peoples (with an "s": "peoples") as such, and not
just rights belonging to people who happen to be Indigenous. In the
Convention there is a savings clause which is attached to the usage of the
term "peoples" to avoid implications regarding self-determination. But that
in no way undermines the collective nature of the rights asserted or affirmed.
And I'll return to the issue of self-determination later. So the titleholders of
rights within this Convention are peoples, again with an "s." That is,
Indigenous groups are deemed to have collective rights in relation to their
lands, the maintenance and development of their cultures, their own
institutions of self-governance, and their own laws and customs. Several
articles, as we heard this morning, relate to and affirm Indigenous laws and
customs in various ways and contexts. This multilateral treaty is now
binding on almost all states in the western hemisphere; among the
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exceptions of course are the United States and Canada, which have not
ratified the treaty. But the refusal thus far of these countries to ratify ILO
Convention 169 does not keep the Convention from setting an international
benchmark-an important normative benchmark at the international level-
or from contributing to a trend that is reflected elsewhere.
Collective human rights are also articulated in the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that has been approved by the UN Human
Rights Council and is now under consideration by the UN General
Assembly. I must add that I think there is still a good bit of hope,
notwithstanding the difficulties we have heard about, for the adoption of the
Declaration by the General Assembly. It is likely, and many would say quite
probable, that the Declaration will be ultimately adopted during the session
that is before September. The Declaration affirms throughout collective
rights of Indigenous peoples, as does also a draft text of the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples coming out of the Organization of the
American States. These texts both affirm an array of collective rights,
similar to the rights affirmed by ILO Convention 169, but in more sweeping
terms. Also relevant is the practice of important international human rights
bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, each of which has referred to
Indigenous peoples as holders or beneficiaries of rights in various
documents including decisions and cases.
Let me say that although many states have in various forms resisted
usage of the term "peoples" when it appears without the kind of qualifier
that is inserted in ILO Convention 169, that resistance has been waning, and
where it remains, it does not generally stand opposed to recognizing
Indigenous collective rights. The trend that can now be seen among states
participating in international discussions about Indigenous rights is to accord
legal entitlements to Indigenous peoples as collective entities. Recognition
of collective rights and their connection to Indigenous peoples' own legal
systems can be found in recent decisions before the Inter-American Human
Rights institutions concerning Indigenous peoples in Nicaragua, the United
States, Belize and Paraguay (and the cat is out of the bag-I've been
involved in some of these cases). These decisions, notwithstanding my
involvement (and I would like to think because of it), each explicitly affirm
the collective rights of Indigenous peoples over land and resources, and they
do so on the basis of Indigenous tradition and customary law. In other
words, much like we were hearing in the Canadian context, Indigenous
peoples rights over lands and resources are deemed to be grounded in
Indigenous customary law. The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have held that
No. I
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property rights arise not just from legal entitlements that are created by the
state, but again from Indigenous customary law related to land. With these
and other developments towards the recognition of collective Indigenous
rights, the international human rights system is moving beyond the
individual/state dichotomy that has in the past framed the dominant thinking.
A second, related way in which Indigenous peoples have helped forge
change in the international legal order has to do with the doctrine of state
sovereignty, a doctrine which is considered one of the bedrock doctrines
within the international legal order. The doctrine of state sovereignty
traditionally has shielded states from scrutiny over matters that are deemed
to be within the realm of their domestic concern. There has been a lot of
scholarly commentary that has been devoted to identifying and explaining
the weakening of the sovereignty shield over the last few decades. And this
weakening is attributed substantially to the international human rights
regime, although that regime has imposed a weakening of the sovereignty
shield mostly in favour of the individual. Indigenous peoples' demands,
which include demands for recognition of Indigenous legal systems and
related collective rights, are resulting in a more radical altering of the state
sovereignty doctrine than that brought about by the internationalization of
individual rights. The assertion of Indigenous group rights, and the assertion
of a space for Indigenous legal systems in particular, challenges the primacy
and sphere of state governing authority in a much more fundamental sense
than classic individual rights. International norms have developed that are in
a meaningful sense upholding the asserted group rights and Indigenous law,
as we've seen manifested in ILO Convention 169 and also in the
developments concerning UN and OAS declarations on Indigenous rights.
The weakening of the state sovereignty shield in this regard is dramatically
evident in the recent proceedings before the Inter-American institutions
already mentioned. States have been called upon to answer for their
promotion of natural resource development or land administration schemes
regarding territories claimed by Indigenous peoples, and have been called
upon to respect Indigenous law regarding land tenure as it affects those
development schemes.
A third and related area of change has to do with the concept of self-
determination. Self-determination is affirmed as a principle of the UN
Charter and as a right of all peoples in the international human rights
covenants, that is the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights. But a
persistent challenge has been to try to explain the meaning of a right to self-
determination, of all peoples, and as a human right in the context of an
international legal order which presumptively upholds the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political unity of states. Typically self-determination
has been understood to mean in its fullest sense a right to independent
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statehood, and hence the central focus and inquiry has been on identifying
the necessarily limited universe of groups that are entitled to become
independent states if they so choose. A premise underlying this approach is
that the state is the highest form of self-determination for cultural or national
communities. This premise is subject to question if only because of the
accelerating developments over the last several decades by which the state
has diminished in importance in the face of both local and transnational
spheres of authority and community.
In pressing their demands internationally, Indigenous peoples have
pointedly undermined the premise of the state as the highest and most
liberating form of human association. Indigenous peoples are seen and, I
think it is fair to say for the most part, see themselves as different from, but
not inferior to, states. The model that is emerging from the interplay of
Indigenous demands and the authoritative responses to those demands is one
that sees Indigenous peoples as simultaneously distinct from, yet part of, the
social fabrics of the states in which they live, as well as parts of other units
of social and political interaction that might include Indigenous
confederations or transnational associations. Within this model, self-
determination is achieved not by independent statehood necessarily, but by
the consensual development of context-specific arrangements that uphold for
Indigenous peoples both spheres of authority commensurate with relevant
historical patterns and rights of participation in the political processes of the
states in which they live. Indigenous peoples' representatives have almost
uniformly disclaimed designs of independent statehood in arguing for self-
determination in front of international bodies. In saying that, I am not
speaking for Indigenous peoples; I am simply observing what I have seen in
international discussions. Of course there are some that have not disclaimed
such aspirations. But for the most part that is the case.
As well, state representatives increasingly have expressed understanding
that the right of self-determination does not necessarily imply the right of a
separate sovereign existence. Thus, the text of the Declaration before the
UN General Assembly explicitly affirms the right of Indigenous peoples to
self-determination. An entire article and other provisions in the preamble are
devoted to explicitly affirming the right of Indigenous peoples to self-
determination. But at the same time, the Declaration clearly presupposes
that Indigenous peoples, having been denied self-determination historically,
will recover or now develop it within the frameworks of the states within
which they live through contextually defined arrangements that
accommodate the diverse realities. That doesn't preclude different
arrangements that require ultimately challenging state authority, or that
substantially require an alteration of current political configurations. But the
assumption and the premise of the Declaration is that these consensual
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arrangements will be arrived at through accommodations within the basic
framework of the states in which Indigenous peoples live. This substantial
innovation in the doctrine of self-determination, which moves beyond the
classic understanding of self-determination as wedded to a right to
independent statehood, clearly has implications beyond the context of
Indigenous peoples.
And finally, another development promoted by the emergence of
Indigenous peoples within the contemporary international system has to do
with the role of non-state actors. Actors other than states have increasing
influence in the international legal system, particularly its human rights
regime. Individuals themselves are now rights-holders and have some access
to the international system in order to claim those rights. Non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), like Amnesty International and the Assembly of
First Nations, influence the development of international law through
advocacy efforts and consultative status with the UN Economic and Social
Council and its subsidiary bodies. Labour unions also have significant access
to the international human rights system, especially through the International
Labour Organization. Private corporations are increasingly scrutinized by
international agencies and non-governmental organizations, and are thus
increasingly subjects of international concern. Therefore the classic
understanding of the subjects of international law is breaking down.
Contemporary international legal discourse does not only involve the
examination of the rights and duties of states; rather, there are now multiple
actors and increasingly multiple rights holders in the contemporary
international system.
Indigenous peoples are among the numerous non-state actors that have
managed to take advantage of openings in the international system and forge
new ones in order to participate and influence decision-making processes
that extend into the international arena. For over three decades, and again,
within this second wave of Indigenous advocacy at the international level,
representatives of Indigenous peoples have been appearing before UN
human rights bodies in increasing numbers and with increasing frequency.
Indigenous peoples have enhanced their access to these bodies as several
organizations of Indigenous peoples have gained official consultative status
with the UN. In response to Indigenous peoples efforts in particular, new
institutions and programs have developed that are providing them unique
avenues of access to the international system. Most notably among these is
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations that has been
in existence since 1982, and was responsible initially for drafting the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Much more recently, there
is the Institution of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, and the Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues. Indigenous peoples and their organizations have direct
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access to these agencies and they appear before them in their public sessions
to make written or oral submissions. Additionally, eight of the 16 members
of the Permanent Forum are named by the president of the UN Economic
and Social Council in consultation with Indigenous peoples and
organizations. This has resulted in eight of these 16 members being from
Indigenous constituencies, among them Willie Littlechild.
The increasing access of Indigenous peoples to the international system
is especially noteworthy in at least two respects. First, without any or much
political influence at the international level to speak of, Indigenous peoples
have been successful in using the language and methods of human rights to
advance their demands. Grounding their demands in generally applicable
human rights principles, they have used their access to the international
system to articulate a vision of themselves different from that previously
advanced and acted upon by dominant actors. And they have greatly
influenced the international agenda of activities that has proceeded in
response to these demands. Second, Indigenous peoples appear to be gaining
recognition as having a unique or sui generis status among non-state actors
within the international arena. And associated with that unique status is an
even more enhanced level of participation. Indigenous peoples clearly are
not like ordinary non-governmental organizations, in that Indigenous
peoples are not simply groups organized around particular interests. Rather,
Indigenous peoples are by definition long-standing communities with
historically rooted cultures, distinct political and social institutions, and their
own legal systems. They seek to have a presence in their own right as
peoples in the international arena, and not just as representatives of a
segment of so-called civil society. Within the United Nations and other
international institutions, various extraordinary mechanisms have been
developed to allow Indigenous representatives to express their concerns and
participate in discussions that affect them. Indigenous peoples are unique
among non-state actors. By gaining a foothold in the international system,
they are a significant force in making that system less state-centered and
more centered on human beings and their multiple relevant configurations.
And this is clearly a phenomenon with more general implications.
To summarize and conclude, Indigenous peoples through a discourse of
human rights are having identifiable impacts on international legal systems,
with implications for the broader international community. These
developments are breaking new ground on issues concerning collective
rights, state sovereignty, self-determination and the role of non-state actors,
with a central feature being a challenge to the state as the sole or primary
means of locating power and authority. Having asserted themselves in the
international arena, Indigenous peoples have pursued a vision of a normative
universe that stands against forces of the kind that have wreaked havoc on
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Indigenous societies throughout history, and a vision that accommodates and
even celebrates diversity in a plural, global community. Indigenous peoples
in this way are helping to bring about change that might just be beneficial to
humanity more broadly and generally. As I say this, I am reminded that such
optimism must always be tempered by an awareness of the harsh realities.
The other night at dinner with a few colleagues, I was asked what I was
going to talk about. I mentioned a few of my key points and the person
sitting next to me said, "I know you've written about that, but do you still
really believe it?" I think so. Once you write something you become
committed to it. More importantly, I believe optimism of this kind can't or
shouldn't be extinguished. Certainly optimism has been an animating force
in the international Indigenous rights movement and that movement has
made a difference.
